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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Case No- 900006

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Priority No. 2

THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES,
Defendant/Petitioner.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on writ of certiorari to
the Utah Court of Appeals from the affirmance of a conviction for
issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, after a jury trial in
the Second Judicial District Court, This Court has jurisdiction
to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp.
1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
1.

Should this Court decline to address defendant's

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and require
that the claim be raised by way of a petition for postconviction
relief pursuant to Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
Because defendant's ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claim was, by its very nature, not raised or decided in
the lower courts, no standard of appellate review is applicable.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Thomas R. Humphries, was charged with
issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann, § 76-6-505(1) (Supp. 1988) (R. 13-14).

Defendant was

convicted as charged after a jury trial held November 4, 1988, in
the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Davis County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, presiding (R.
57).

Defendant was sentenced by Judge Cornaby to a term of not

more than five years in the Utah State Prison, fined $5,000, and
ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $1,826.15 (Id. ) .
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed
defendant's conviction on Nove*mber 15, 1989, in an unpublished
Memorandum Decision (R. 219-21); State v. Humphries, No. 880704CA (Utah Ct. App. Nov 15, 1989) (per curiam) (unpublished) (see
Appendix "A"; Memorandum Decision).

This Court granted

defendant's petition for writ of certiorari on April 24, 1990.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 5, 1988, defendant opened a checking account at
the Washington Drive-up Branch of First Security Bank in Ogden,
Utah. (T. 79, 159-60J.1

Defendant deposited $100.00 into the new

checking account, the only deposit ever made by defendant (T. 7981).

Subsequently, defendant issued the following checks which

were not honored by the bank:
DATE WRITTEN

PAYEE

AMOUNT

May 26, 1988
May 27, 1988
May 30, 1988

Bowman's Market
Bowman's Market
K-Mart

$ 90.00
$ 90.00
$273.36

"T" refers to the trial transcript dated November 4, 1988.

May 30, 1988
June 5, 1988

Bowman's Market
Ernst

$ 70.00
$ 93-19

June 5, 1988

Ernst

$ 70-93

(R- 29). Additionally, numerous other checks totaling $1,221.62
were issued and returned for insufficient funds (R. 29; T. 8898).

At the time of trial, defendant had not attempted to pay

for the dishonored checks (T. 98).
At trial, defense counsel in his opening statement
explained that sometime between May 5 and 15, 1988, defendant had
given a friend, Dorie Stewart, the sum of $3,600 in cash along
with a deposit slip to be deposited into his checking account (T.
157-58, 174-77, 182). Defendant later testified that unbeknownst
to him, Stewart did not deposit the cash but applied it to a debt
he owed to her (T. 174-78).
Defendant claimed that the $3,600 in cash was a
settlement from a fire insurance claim which was split between
him and two business partners (T. 180-81).

However, he offered

no evidence to corroborate his testimony that he had received a
$3,600 insurance settlement.

Finally, he stated that he did not

report the $3,600 taken by Stewart to the police because he owed
her some money (T. 190).
Defendant called Dorie Stewart to corroborate his
testimony that he had given her $3,600 in cash to deposit into
his account (T. 166-72).

Out of the presence of the jury, the

prosecutor voir dired Stewart, asking her if she understood that
if she testified that she received the money from defendant but
kept it without his permission, she was either guilty of theft or
of perjury (T. 168-74).

The jury reentered the courtroom (T.

171).

When asked by defense counsel if defendant gave her the

money,

Stewart invoked her fifth amendment privilege? against

compulsory self-incrimination (Id.).
In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor
commented that Stewart "did not want to lie, but she also didn't
want to tell the hard truth and that is that this man is
dishonest.

She took the easy way out by claiming the Fifth

Amendment." (T. 216-17).
On appeal from his conviction, defendant was appointed
Steven C. Vanderlinden as new counsel on appeal. Mr.
Vanderlinden filed the Brief of Appellant in the Utah Court of
Appeals on May 5, 1989, raising five claims of error:

(1) the

prosecutor expressed his personal opinion in closing argument
that defendant was dishonest and that Stewart invoked her fifth
amendment privilege because she did not want to lie; (2) the
prosecutor threatened a defense witness not to testify; (3) the
prosecutor commented on defendant's failure to corroborate his
story; (4) the trial court admitted evidence of other bad checks
not charged in the information; and (5) defendant's counsel at
preliminary hearing had a conflict of interest.

(See Appendix

"B"; Brief of Appellant).
On June 26, 1989, defendant filed a pro se Motion to
Appoint New Counsel on Pendency of Appeal.

On July 20, 1989, the

Court of Appeals issued an order denying defendant's motion on
the basis that counsel had timely responded to the court with
respect to the appeal and that defendant had not shown a
substantial conflict of interest with his counsel. (See Appendix
"C"; Order).

Mr. Vanderlinden filed a reply brief on September 22,
1989, claiming that he had preserved the issues raised on appeal
by seeking a certificate of probable cause in the district court
on the same grounds. (See Appendix "D"; Reply Brief).
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant's claims,
finding that the first four claims had not been preserved for
appeal and that the final claim was personally waived by
defendant.

State v. Humphries/ No. 880704-CA, slip. op. at 2-4.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should not consider defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim which is raised for the first time in
this Court.

Rather, such claims should be raised in the context

of a postconviction action where an evidentiary record may be
established and any legal remedies imposed.

If defendant seeks

postconviction relief claiming prosecutorial misconduct in
closing argument, the State may well concede that defendant is
entitled to a new trial or new appeal.

It would be a Pandora's

box for this Court to open the door to unsuccessful appellants
who wish to distance themselves from and second guess their
appellate counsel.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER ISSUES ON
CERTIORARI WHICH WERE NOT RAISED IN THE COURT
OF APPEALS.
Defendant claims he was denied his right to effective
assistance of appellate counsel in the Utah Court of Appeals.
Specifically, defendant alleges that appellate counsel failed to
raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel or plain error as a

means to avoid the requirement that appellate issues be preserved
in the lower court.

He claims prejudice resulted when the Court

of Appeals refused to consider four of the five issues raised on
appeal because they were not preserved below.

Defendant's claim

of appellate counsel ineffectiveness should not be considered.
This case raises the novel question whether claims of
appellate counsel ineffectiveness could and should be raised on
direct appeal, or more particularly, on certiorari to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

The procedural alternatives are either to

allow such claims on certiorari, or to require that they be
brought in a postconviction action.

The latter choice is

preferable.
General principles of appellate review require that
matters raised on appeal should also have been raised and decided
2
in the lower court.
fold:

The purpose of this requirement is two-

(1) to encourage trial counsel to timely raise all

objections so prejudice may be avoided; and (2) to establish a
factual and legal basis upon which a full review may be
3
conducted.
2
See State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983) (appellate
court will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal); EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U.S. 19, 24 (1985) (normal practice
is to refrain from addressing issues in a petition for writ of
certiorari which were not raised in the Court of Appeals).
3
See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (contemporaneous objection
required); State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984) (defendant
must have specifically stated to the trial court the same grounds
for objection to evidence he presents on appeal); State v. Hales,
652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982) (failure to object to allegedly
improper comment by prosecutor acts as waiver); State v. Lesley,
672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983) (trial judges should have an
opportunity to address an allcsged error); State v. Parsons, 781
P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989) (procedurally unjustified to raise

Likewise, errors which could and should have been
raised on direct appeal cannot be raised in a postconviction
action, except in unusual circumstances.
P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983).

Codianna v. Morris, 660

Unusual circumstances may include

ineffectiveness of counsel claims which could not have been
4
raised on direct appeal.
The State is mindful of the well-settled principle that
postconviction remedies "cannot be used to perform the function
of regular appellate review."
1104.

Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at

However, regular appellate review generally should not

include claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness.

This is so

because an ineffectiveness claim raises a mixed question of fact
and law which usually necessitates an evidentiary hearing.

Such

claims should be raised in the postconviction context where
evidence may be taken and factual disputes resolved.

Upon a full

inquiry into the underlying facts, the evidence may reveal a
5
reasonable explanation for appellate counsel's actions.
Cont. issue on appeal where ample opportunity existed in the
lower court to avoid any harm).
4

See Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah 1989) (trial
counsel ineffectiveness may be raised in postconviction action
where trial counsel also represented the defendant on direct
appeal); Jensen v. Deland, 795 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 1990) (trial
counsel ineffectiveness may be raised in postconviction action
where appellate counsel was precluded from raising claim due to
absence of record support); Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 878
(Utah 1990) (appellate counsel ineffectiveness may be raised in
postconviction action where appellate counsel filed an Anders
brief on appeal without sufficient factual and legal support).
5
Matters of appellate strategy should be generally left to the
discretion of counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820
(1975). The selection of issues to be raised on appeal is a
matter of appellate strategy. Gerald v. United States, 405
F.Supp. 404, 406 (E.D.N.C. 1975). Appointed counsel on appeal
does not have a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous

The record before this Court is inadequate to perform a
plenary review.

Defendant's claim that he requested appellate

counsel to raise ineffectiveness and plain error is unsupported
by the record.

See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 393 (Utah 1986)

(where the record is not entirely clear on an issue and provides
an inadequate basis on which to fully examine defendant's claim,
Court will generally assume the validity of the court action
below).

This Court should not consider an ineffectiveness claim

which is not based upon evidence, but upon mere speculation.

See

State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203 (Utah 1984) (counsel's
ineffectiveness must be a demonstrable reality, not a speculative
matter).
It may be argued that while the general rule should
preclude ineffectiveness of appellate counsel claims on
certiorari to this Court, the record before this Court is
sufficiently clear to establish that appellate counsel did not
raise trial counsel ineffectiveness or plain error and that no
conceivable appellate strategy could exist for such failure.
Even so, it is procedurally preferable to require defendant to
raise appellate counsel ineffectiveness by means of
postconviction relief under Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Cont. issue requested by a criminal defendant. Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)• Rather, experienced appellate
counsel may reasonably select a few key issues upon which to
concentrate and winnow out weaker arguments which may distract
the appellate court from the stronger arguments. Ld. at 751-53.
See also Caruso v. Zelinsky, 515 F.Supp. 676, 685 (D.N.J. 1981),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, United States ex rel. Caruso v.
Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1982).

First, principles of fairness suggest that defendant's
appellate counsel should be given the opportunity to explain his
conduct and the surrounding circumstances.

Second, it would be a

Pandora's box for this Court to open the door to unsuccessful
appellants who wish to distance themselves from and second-guess
their appellate counsel.

Third, the postconviction remedies

under Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provide a
speedy and adequate remedy for such claims.
This Court should be aware that if defendant seeks
postconviction relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument, the State may well concede that
error occurred when the prosecutor commented to the jury that
defendant's alibi witness invoked her fifth amendment privilege
7
because she did not want to lie.
If prejudicial error is found,

Other courts have permitted ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel claims to be brought in a postconviction or habeas corpus
context. See Cutbrith v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1263 (Wyo. 1988)
(ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not an issue
which can be foreclosed as a matter of waiver or default because
it cannot be raised in the initial appeal); Baker v. State, 755
P.2d 493, 496-500 (Kan. 1988) (applying Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 688 (1984), standard to postconviction claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); Bryant v. State,
720 P.2d 1015, 1018-21 (Hawaii App. 1986) (reviewing ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim raised in a post-conviction
action).
7

See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 186-87 (1962) (court
must look at surrounding circumstances in determining whether a
prosecutor made impermissible inferences from a witness's use of
the privilege against self-incrimination); Tovar v. State, 777
S.W.2d 481, 488 (Tex. App. 1989) (when a witness, other than an
accused, declines to testify on the ground that his answers would
tend to incriminate him, that refusal alone cannot be made the
basis of any inference to the jury, either favorable to the
prosecution or to the accused); State v. Person, 215 Conn. 653,
577 A.2d 1036, 1040-42 (1990) (state cannot build its case out of
inferences arising from use of testimonial privilege).

the postconviction court has authority to order a new trial for
defendant or a resentencing to allow a new appeal to be brought.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(1)(8); State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 3738 (Utah 1981) .
In sum, ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims
should be required to be brought on direct appeal if supported by
the record and a defendant is represented by new counsel on
appeal.

See Jensen v. Deland, 795 P.2d at 621. However,

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims are in a
different posture and should be required to be brought in a
postconviction action where an evidentiary record may be
developed and any legal remedy imposed.

Accordingly, defendant's

claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness, made for the first
time on certiorari, should be considered procedurally improper.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully
requests this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals' decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^t^-^SSSf

of October, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. EARSI
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to E.
Jay Sheen, attorney for appellant, 600 Deseret Plaza, No. 15 East
First South, Salt Lake City, Utah
November, 1990.
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State of Utah,

Cc.i./,,.,.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 880704-CA

v.
Thomas R. Humphries,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Orme, Carff and Davidson.

PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a conviction for Issuing Bad Checks, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1)
(Supp. 1988). We affirm the conviction.
On May 5, 1988, defendant Thomas R. Humphries opened a
checking account at the Washington Drive-up Branch of First
Security Bank in Ogden, Utah. Defendant deposited $100 into the
account, which was the only deposit he ever made. The bad check
charge was based on the following six checks that were not
honored by the bank:
DATE WRITTEN
May 26,
May 27,
May 30,
May 30,
June 5,
June 5,

1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1968

PAYEE
Bowman's Market
Bowman's Market
K-Mart
Bowman's Market
Ernst
Ernst

AMOUNT
$ 90.00
$ 90.00
$273.36
$ 70.00
$ 93.19
$ 70.93

At trial, the State introduced into evidence fifteen additional
checks that had been returned for insufficient funds. Each of
those checks was dated prior to the six checks described above.
Humphries testified that he did not knowingly issue the
bad checks. He explained that sometime between May 5 and 15,
1988, he had given a friend, Dorie Stewart, a deposit slip and

$3,600 in cash to be deposited in his checking account. He
claimed that Stewart did not deposit the cash, but applied it
to a debt owing to her by defendant. Defendant testified that
the money was a settlement from a fire insurance claim which
was split between him and two business partners. He testified
that he did not report the money taken by Stewart to the police
because he owed her money.
Defendant called Dorie Stewart as a witness. Prior to
her testimony, counsel for the State examined her on voir
dire. Outside the presence of the jury, counsel advised
Stewart of her rights under the Fifth Amendment against
self-incrimination and of the penalties for theft and perjury.
Stewart then declined to testify based on the Fifth Amendment.
In closing argument, the State told the jury that
Stewart "didn't want to lie, but she also didn't want to tell
the hard truth and that is, that this man is dishonest".
The
prosecutor also stated in closing that defendant is a
-dishonest person" and to "disregard the testimony of the
defendant because of his dishonesty."
On appeal, defendant raises five claims of error.
First, he claims it was prejudicial error for the prosecution
to state to the jury, in closing argument, his opinion that
defendant was a dishonest person. Second, he contends that the
prosecution improperly threatened a witness if she testified.
Third, he asserts that it was prejudicial error for the
prosecution to question defendant as to why he did not subpoena
a witness for trial. Fourth, defendant contends it was
prejudicial error to allow bank records into evidence that were
not a basis for the charges against defendant.
Finally,
defendant urges that it was error to allow defense counsel to
represent defendant at the preliminary hearing where he had
admitted he had a conflict of interest.
In response, the State
contends that defendant failed to preserve the first four
issues for appeal and argues that the final issue is meritless
because defendant expressly waived the conflict.
We have reviewed the portions of the record pertaining
to the assignments of error and agree that four of the issues
have not been properly preserved for appeal. First, the record
reflects no objection to the prosecutor's comments in closing
argument. Absent an objection, we are precluded from reaching
the merits of the issue on appeal. See State v. HglgE' 652
P.2d 1290,,1292 (Utah 1982). As to the second assignment of

error, the record contains no objection to the voir dire
examination of witness L :ie Stewart. Third, although we agree
it is inappropriate during cross examination for the
prosecution to make any suggestion that defendant has a burden
to establish a defense, the record also contains no objection
to the prosecution's questions concerning defendant's failure
to secure corroborative testimony. The foregoing issues were
not properly preserved in the trial court and may not be
considered for the first time on appeal.
Defendant's fourth contention is somewhat more
complicated. The charges against defendant were based upon the
six checks previously set out in this decision. At trial, the
prosecution examined the custodian of the records pertaining to
defendant's checking account. The witnesses' testimony covered
all transactions on the account during its existence. At the
beginning of the testimony, defendant's counsel made a general
objection "to the relevancy of the bank records other than
those records that particularly pertain to the exhibit that the
state has entered." The trial court clarified the nature of
the objection with counsel by inquiring if counsel was
objecting to the admission of "other checks other than the ones
that we're prosecuting." Defense counsel agreed that this was
the objection he intended to make. The court overruled the
objection "at this time," indicating "I haven't heard anything
objectionable, but you'll have to redo your objection if
something comes up that is objectionable." Defense counsel
acquiesced in this procedure. The prosecution submitted
photocopies of fifteen checks, in addition to the six checks
that are the basis of the charge. Defense counsel objected to
the use of photocopies of the checks, which was resolved, but
made no other objection to the admission of the checks. We
conclude that the issue has not been preserved for
consideration on appeal.
Defendant's final claim is that the jury verdict should
be overturned because counsel who represented defendant at the
preliminary hearing had a conflict. We note that the
preliminary hearing transcript was not transmitted to this
court by the trial court as a portion of the official recordInstead, the first eleven pages of a document entitled
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing was submitted as an addendum
to defendant's brief and, as such, is not a part of the
official record before this court. We further note, however,
that both defendant and the State have relied upon this
addendum, and on that basis, neither may challenge its validity
as an accurate depiction of the proceedings. At the time of
the preliminary hearing, defense counsel, Glen Cella, indicated

that, based on a police report he had not seen prior to that
day, he determined that he had a conflict in representing
defendant.
The report reflected that charges had been
investigated by Kaysville City Police, and defense counsel had
served as a prosecutor for Kaysville in the past. After
consultation, however, defendant determined that he would waive
the conflict for purposes of the preliminary hearing only. The
trial court examined defendant about his waiver and ruled that
the hearing could continue. Substitute defense counsel
represented defendant at the trial.
(At the commencement of
the trial, defendant made a motion to disqualify substitute
counsel, which was denied.) Defendant now renews his original
objection to Cella's representation at the preliminary hearing,
attacking his own waiver of the conflict on the basis that he
should not have been put to the choice of waiving the conflict
or waiting in jail for substitute counsel's appointment. A
defendant generally may not premise a claim of error on a
ruling that he himself both assented to and sought. See, e.c.,
State v. Parsons, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 25 (Utah 1989) (A
defendant may not allege on appeal prejudicial error which was
affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived); State v.
Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987) (Invited error is
procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially
where ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a
result). We hold that defendant has waived the apparent
conflict of interest and may not premise error on that basis.
For the foregoing reasons, the conviction appealed
affirmed.
is
ALL

CT^ilR
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Richard

C. Davidson, Judge
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v,

:

THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES,

:

Defendant-Apellant

Case No. 880104-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken pursuant to Sec. 78-29-3 (f) Utah Code
Annotated.

The Defendant-Appellant was found guilty of Issuing a

Bad Check or Draft Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated, a Felony of
the Third Degree in the Second Judicial District Court, in and
for Davis County, State of Utah, November 4, 1988.

Defendant was

sentenced December 6, 1988 and an appeal was filed December 22,
1988.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1-

Whether or not it was prejudicial error for the

prosecution to state to the jury in his closing argument that in
his opinion the Defendant was a dishonest nan, and in the opinion
of a witness who didn't testify that he was a dishonest man.
2-

Whether or not it was prejudicial error to allow the

prosecution to threaten a witness if she testified.

3-

Whether or not it was prejudicial error for the state to

question the Defendant as to why he didn't subpoena a certain
witness.
4-

Whether or not it was prejudicial error to allow bank

records into evidence that were not part of the charges against
the Defendant.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions will be
excerpted as they become relevant in the argument, and provided
in full in the appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary hearing was held in the Fourth Circuit Court,
Layton Department, on September 8, 1988.
over for Trial.

The Defendant was bound

A jury trial was held on November 4, 1988, and

the Defendant was found guilty of issuing a bad check or draft in
violation of Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated.
was sentenced to prison on December 6, 1988.

The Defendant

An appeal was filed

on December 22, 1988.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about May 1, 1988, Tom Humphries opened a checking
account with First Security Bank.(T.173).
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He gave Dorie Stewart,

a good friend, S3,600.00.(T.175). He asked Dorie Stewart to
deposit the money in his checking account because he was working
10-14 hours a day.(T.174).

He received the money from G.A.B.

Adjusters who represented the Firemanfs Fund Insurance.(T.175).
Thereafter Mr. Humphries wrote numerous checks on that account.
(T.176, T.177).

Mr. Humphries, on June 6, 1988, went to

Portland, Oregon to handle some business on June 6, 1988.(T.179)
and came back the middle of August.(T.179).

Upon his return he

learned that Dorie Stewart had used the money and not deposited
it in his checking account.
(T.178).

Later Mr. Humphries was arrested, a preliminary hearing

held and then the matter was set for Jury Trial.

During the

Trial, Mr. Humphries called Dorie Stewart to the stand.(T.166).
Before Defense counsel could begin testimony, the State
requested the opportunity to Voir Dire Dorie Stewart.(T.168).
The State threatened Dorie Stewart with prosecution for
theft.(T.169).

Then the State advised her that she wouldn't

have to testify.(T.169) and that if she did testify, those
things could be used against her.(T.169).

Dorie Stewart

subsequently refused to testify and took the Fifth Amendment.
(T.171).

In closing argument, the State told the jury that

Dorie Stewart, "didn't want to lie, but she also didn't want to
tell the hard truth and that is, that this man is dishonest'*.
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(T.217).

The prosecutor then went on to give his personal

opinion, "That the defendant is a dishonest person"(T.212) and
to -disregard the testimony of the defendant because of his
dishonesty"(T.227).

After the prosecutor gave his opinion

of what Dorie Stewart would state under oath, even though he
successfully intimidated her so she didn't testify, the jury
found Mr. Humphries guilty as charged.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Trial of Defendant was fraught with error.

It is a well

established legal principal supported by hundreds of Decisions
that a Trial must be conducted in such a way that no prejudice or
unfair advantage attaches to either the State or the Defendant.
The fact that the prosecutor steps forward and gives his opinion
to the jury that the Defendant is a dishonest man, is enough to
substantiate prejudice, couple the prosecutor giving his own
opinion and then giving the opinion of a witness who he prevented
from testifying and clearly the Defendant was prejudiced beyond
harmless error.
Further, the State went beyond the bonds of fair play when
they clearly intimidated a Defendant's witness into not
testifying.

The State has substantial power that they must use

carefully, and comments to a witness by the State about filing
theft charges against her were inappropriate.

The Judge should

have done the questioning and Dorie Stewart should of had the
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advice of an attorney.

What was the purpose of advising her of

theft charges, when the ••alleged" victim was the Defendant and
he had never expressed a desire to prosecute for the •'alleged**
theft.

The prosecution simply intimidated the witness.

Finally, the verdict should be overturned because the State
implied the Defendant had a burden of proof in the case, offered
in evidence.

Of other returned checks that Mr. Humphrey had

written and gave Mr. Humphries an attorney at preliminary hearing
who had a conflict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE PROSECUTION
TO STATE TO THE JURY IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT IN HIS
OPINION THE DEFENDANT WAS A DISHONEST MAN.
It is a well established rule of law that it is improper for
a lawyer to assert in closing argument his personal belief or
opinion as to the guilt of the accused,(88 ALR 3d 463). The
present case falls under that well established law.

The

prosecutor stated on more than one occasion in his closing
argument that the Defendant was dishonest.

Based on those

statements the guilty verdict against Thomas R. Humphries should
be overturned.
Many states besides Utah support the proposition that
personal belief or opinion by a prosecutor is improper.
opinion or belief has been held improper and the verdict
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The

overturned when prosecutors express their opinion or belief in
many different ways.
369 A2d 276 (1976).

In Commonwealth v. Gilmore 245 Pa Super 27,
The court overturned the verdict because the

prosecutor said "that Commonwealth had given jurors "the truth".
In Artis v Commonwealth 213 VS 220, 191 SE2d 190(1972) the
decision was overturned because the prosecutor stated that he
could never bring to Court a case which was more convincing.

See

also People vs. Rosado 43 App. Div. 2d 916, 352 NYS2d 11,(9174),
wherein the following statement by the prosecutor was deemed
improper. "I think I am almost making a fool of myself making a
summation in the case because the case is open and shut." Another
case specifically in point is Commonwealth v. Valle 240 Pa.
Super 411, 362 A2d 1021(1976).

In that case the prosecutor

said:
"I say to you, if by pleading not guilty that vicious
guy over there, Martin Valle, says: I didn't do these
things, then I say to you Martin Valle is a liar"(emphasis
added).
There are numerous Western State decisions which hold the
same proposition.

A 1982 Wyoming case reiterated the law when

they held:
"It is improper for prosecutors to either vouch for
their own credibility or to testify as to their own
personal belief or opinion of matter in controversy."
Banners v. State 642 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1982). See also
People v. Loscutoff 661 P.2d 274 (Col. 1983).
Utah law adopted much the same posture, only preferring to
use a two prong test, the case law seems to have started in
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State v. Valdez 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973) and has since
been referred to and used as the standard on several different
occasions.

The most recent reference by the Utah Supreme Court

seems to be State v. Laffertv 749 P.2d 1239(Utah 1988).
More specifically the two-part test as outlined in all the
above cases is stated in State vs. Slowe as follows:
"Slowe also contends that the prosecutor's
use of the word fence ,during closing arguments
amounted to a reversible error. We disagree.
A prosecutor's comments warrant reversible only
if (1) the comments call the jury's attention to
matters the jury was not justified in considering,
and (2) the jurors were probably influenced by
the remarks." State vs. Slowe 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985)
Thus, in order to overturn the present case on DefendantAppellant, the Court roust determine whether the opinions given by
the prosecutor were: (1) comments which called the jury's
attention to matters the jury was not justified in considering,
and (2) whether those comments probably influenced the
jury.
Both parts of the test are clearly met in the present
case.

The prosecutor was content to state his opinion only once

in closing argument on Mr. Humphries case.

During his 15 minutes

of closing argument and rebuttal he stated the following:
"When we began our case in the morning, hours
of this day, we never told you that the Defendant
was going to be honest, that he was going to tell
the truth, or that he had ever told the truth in
any day of his life* (emphasis added) (T.211)
"The Defendant is a dishonest person" (T.212)

-7-

-The only doubt that has been provided hereto
you today has been possible, fanciful or imaginary.
Do not dignify it with any more than that in your
deliberations" (T.217)
"That is what I ask you to do here today and
that is to disregard the testimony of the Defendant
because of his dishonesty. - (T.227)
"I've tried to sell you today that the Defendant
is dishonest". (T.228)
-That's the statement of a dishonest man and
the conclusion that you must draw is that the doubt
before you is not a reasonable one.- (T.230)
Any one of the above opinions of the prosecutor are
detrimental and damaging to the Defendant, and each on its own
calls the jury's attention to the prosecutor's opinion that the
Defendant is dishonest.

The prosecutor has absolutely no right

to give his opinion to the jury because the jury cannot use or
judge a person's guilt or innocence by that criteria.

In this

case, the prosecutor on several occasions gave his opinion, thus
satisfying the first test enumerated in State vs. Valdez
(supra.)

Comments were made (prosecutor's opinion) which called

the jury's attention to matters the jury should not consider.
The second part of the test, ie, whether or not the comments
probably influenced the jury.

The Defendant Appellant

respectfully points out that there is no question but what the
limited burden of probably influencing the jury has been met.
Because the statements were multiple and because they were made
by the prosecutor they did influence the jury. The case has the
prosecutor, the very person by his office, who the jury would
look to for honesty and integrity, the person who represents the
-8-

State, ie, the people, and therefore someone who's opinion should
not be regarded lightly.

He stands for law and order, and

enforcement of our laws, principals we all believe in and hope
are accomplished.

When he states something to the jury, it must

be done with the up most concern for his office and position.
His comments, his opinions are by the nature of his office, held
in high esteem by the jury.
One statement by the prosecutor to the jury giving his
opinion that the Defendant is dishonest meet the burden of
probably influencing them.

The prosecutor in this case, however,

was not content to tell the jury his opinion once.

On no less

than six different occasions, the prosecutor alluded to or
stated that in his opinion the Defendant was dishonest.

As

stated in State vs. Abu-Isba 685 P.2d 235 (Kan. 1985):
"Error is committed when prosecutor injects
his or her personnel opinion into closing arguments."
There is no question but what the prosecutor made a
mistake.
guilty.

A mistake that has influenced a jury to find a man
The only way to rectify the problem is to rule the

numerous comments were reversible error.
The second part of the first point that the DefendantAppellant wants to raise with the Court is very similar to the
prosecutor giving his own opinion.

The only difference is that

not only did the prosecutor give his own opinion about the case,
but he went on to give the opinion as to what a witness would
-9-

testify about, when in fact he prevented that witness from
testifying.

Thus, the prosecution in his closing argument gave

his opinion as to what Dorie Stewart would have stated if she
would have testified.
The closing argument of the prosecutor is filed with
numerous references to the prosecutors opinion of the Defendant's
dishonesty.

Unfortunately, the prosecutor didn't stop with his

own opinion, he compounded his errors by giving the opinion of a
witness who was forced to take the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Dorie Stewart was subpoenaed by the Defendant and was called to
the stand. After some brief foundational questions, the
prosecutor asked permission to Voir Dire, wherein the following
exchange took place:
Q. Do you understand that if you took money without permission
from someone, even though that person may have owed you money,
that could be considered theft?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

That you could be prosecuted for that?

A,

Uh-huh.

Q. You understand, as you testify here, no one has offered you
any immunity and you could therefore..the things that you say
here could be used against you?
A.

Uh-huh. (T.169)
After the above exchange took place, the witness Dorie

Stewart chose to exercise her Fifth Amendment privilege and not
to testify(T.170). Despite Dorie Stewart not testifying, the
prosecutor stated in his closing argument:
-10-

"We had a witness who took the stand who said
nothing. Dorie said nothing. She took the Fifth
Amendment. What does that mean to you? Don't get
caught in the trap to think that's an admission on
her part. I submit to you that she didn't want to
hurt her friends here, that her friend had asked
her to come and testify, gave her a subpoena which
she couldn't disobey. She had to sit on the stand.
She wanted to tell the truth, but then she didn't
want to have to tell the truth. She didn't want to
lie, but she also didn't want to tell the hard truth
and that is that this man is dishonest. She took the
easy way out by claiming the Fifth Amendment." (emphasis
added) (T.216, 217)
POINT II
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW THE PROSECUTION
TO THREATEN A WITNESS IF SHE TESTIFIED
The Defendant has a statutory and constitutional right to
have the witnesses on his behalf to testify.

The intimidating

nature of the prosecutor's questioning and his reference to
possible theft charges, caused the witness to refuse to testify,
and thereby violating one of the Defendant's basic rights.
The legislature of the State of Utah has seen fit to enact
basic rights of a person accused of a crime.

Sec. 77-1-6, Utah

Code Ann. states in part:
"(1) In criminal prosecutions, the Defendant is
entitled
(e) to have compulsory process to insure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf."
The Constitution of Utah, Article I Sec. 9 states:
"In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right....to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf."
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The Defense cognizant of his constitutional and statutory
rights subpoenaed Dorie Stewart.

Dorie Stewart had been a friend

of the Defendant since January of 1988 (T.174).

The alleged

issuing of bad checks took place in May, 1988 (T.176) and the
Witness Dorie Stewart was testifying on November 4, 1988(T.i).
Dorie, according to Defense Counsel's opening remarks was suppose
to testify that she was to deposit the money in Tom's account.
(T.158) Before any testimony could be elicited the prosecutor
requested and was granted the right to Voir Dive.

The following

took place:
Q. Do you understand that you have a right against having to
say anything in court that would indicate that you've done
anything that's criminal? Do you understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm having to anticipate somewhat some of the things that
you might be asked to testify about just based upon the
conversations that I've had from counsel.
Do you understand that if you took money without
permission from someone even though that person may have owed you
that money, that could be considered theft? (Emphasis added)
A. Yeah.
Q. That you could be prosecuted for that?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You understand, as you testify here, no one has offered
you any immunity and you could, therefore — the things that you
say here could be used against you?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You understand, also what the word -perjury* means?
A. Yeah.
Q. Could you explain to the Court what you understand
perjury to mean.
12-

A. If I get up here and I don't tell the truth lying to the
Court.
Q. You understand there would be a criminal penalty if you
were to say anything other than the truth?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Understanding those things, you understand that if you
desire not to testify, you can tell counsel or the Court that you
don't want to answers questions?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Even though, and that you still want to answer questions
today?
A. Yeah.
THE COURT:

Is that a yes or no?

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Is that all of your Vcir Dire?

MR. NAMBA:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Ask the jurors to come back in.

The prosecutor had no right to threaten the witness with
theft.

The threat is even more chilling when you realize that it

comes from a person representing the State.
indeed file criminal charges against you.

Someone who can
Someone who wants to

convict the witness friend of a crime, the Judge, an impartial
man was present, he is present to see that a fair trial takes
place.

He is the person to ask a person about Fifth Amendment

privileges. Based on the inappropriate questions by the
prosecutor, Dorie Stewart refused to testify and the Defendant
was deprived of a constitutional right.
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POINT III
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE STATE TO QUESTION
THE DEFENDANT AS TO WHY HE DID NOT SUBPOENA A CERTAIN WITNESS
A Defendant has a right to a free and impartial trial, he
has no burden of proof whatsoever-

He can testify or not

testify, he can call ten witnesses or none.
burden, they must present evidence.

The State has the

They must prove the evidence

against the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

The

prosecutor's questioning of the Defendant clearly infringed on
Defendant's privileges and rights, the Defendant chose to take
the stand and testify, on cross-examination the prosecutor asked
the Defendant the following:
Q.

Steve is a friend of yours?

A.

A business relationship.

Q.

You didn't ask him to come and testify?

(T.182)
Then the prosecutor elicits statements from the Defendant
about what Dorie Stewart had told him. (Despite the fact that he
had successfully suppressed her testimony).
Q. During the period from the 15th of May to the 6th of
June, when you moved out, did you have daily contact with Dorie?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

She never told you that she deposited the money.

A.

She told me that she deposited the money.

Q.
later?

Then she finally told you over the telephone sometime

-14-

A. No, she didn't. She told me that Donna Shaffer had said
that a police officer had come by asking some questions and
trying to determine why they would come back to ask me questions
is when I realized that something had happened with the checking
account. (T.188)
Later, the prosecutor asks more questions about what Dorie
Stewart said.
Q.

What did Dorie tell you over the phone?

A. Dorie told me that Donna Shaffer said that somebody came
by with a suit on asking questions.
Q.

Dorie did not know of her knowledge what had happened?

A. I guess Dorie heard from Donna Shaffer that Detective
Barton had been by. (T.195)
In closing argument, the prosecutor said the following:
"Don't you think you could come up with some
proof that you held an insurance claim with
someone when you have three partners to split
the money, two other partners to split the money
with, one of them that would come and testify
that we split the money with him or the insurance
company? Even a letter from the insurance company
certifying that they had given him a settlement
on this."
"We had a witness who took the stand who said
nothing. Dorie said nothing. She took the
Fifth Amendment. What does that mean to you?
Don't get caught in the trap to think thatfs
an admission on her part . . . she took the
easy way out by claiming the Fifth Amendment."
(T.215)
The Nevada Supreme Court had a situation similar to ours and
ruled as follows:
"Prosecutors comment in closing argument in
prosecution for forgery, suggesting that it
was defendantsvs burden to produce proof by
explaining absence of witnesses or "come up
with something" was clearly inaccurate and
improper" Emerson vs State 643 P. 2d 1212 (Nev. 1982)
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Other Jurisdictions have also ruled the same way.
"Comments of prosecutor during closing argument
regarding defendant's failure to present evidence
in support of his defense which comments did not
pertain to punishment were prejudicial and intentional
making a new trial necessary. Watt v. City of Oklahoma
628 P.2d 371(Okl. 1981). See also State v. Froats
615 P.2d 1078 (Or. 1980) where the Court held it was error
to comment in jury argument on the failure of a witness
to testify who has validly invoked that privilege (Fifth
Amendment privilege).
The prosecutor violated not only the privilege against self
incrimination but Defendant's right to due process, ie, the right
of innocent until proven guilty.
POINT IV
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW BANK RECORDS
INTO EVIDENCE THAT WERE NOT PART OF THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT
The Defendant was prejudiced when his checking account
records, which showed other checks that had not been honored by
the bank, were given to the jury as evidence even though no
criminal charges had been filed on the additional checks.

The

checks tainted the jury's view of the Defendant.
The Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 states:
"Although relevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury* or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time# or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
At trial, Defense counsel objected to admission of all
checks and records other than those being prosecuted. (T.79)
The prosecution than proceeded to offer several checks into
evidence that were not honored by the bank. (T.83, 90, 91, 92,
93, and 94). There was no purpose in discussing those checks.
-16-

They were not part of the State's case as provided in the
information.

The only purpose of presenting the checks was to

prejudice the jury.
The Defendant did not have a fair and impartial jury hear
his case.

The jury heard evidence of other checks to other

stores which prejudiced the jury made it hard not to be biased.
Improper evidence which prejudices the jury is grounds for
reversible error and the Defendant states the the prejudice in
this case would be sufficient for a new trial.
POINT V
WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL
TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT WHEN HE ADMITTED HE HAD A CONFLICT.
The Defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel.
Counsel that is free from bias or prejudice.

The counsel that

represented Mr. Humphries at the Preliminary Hearing was the
prosecutor for Kaysville city and admitted on the record he had a
conflict of interest.

Mr. Humphries did not receive the benefit

of fair and impartial counsel at the Preliminary Hearing and the
guilty verdict should be overturned.
There does not seem to be any question that the attorney who
represented the Defendant at the Preliminary Hearing had a
conflict.

At the start of the Preliminary Hearing, it was

established that the arresting officer was a Kaysville officer
(Preliminary Hearing T.3).

That the Defense attorney was

employed by Kaysville City (Preliminary Hearing T.3). Then
Defense counsel on the record stated:
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w

At that point in time, I indicated that
if he wanted to proceed with trial I didn't
feel like it was appropriate for me to proceed
with trial since it involved a Kaysville city
officer. He agreed, and that's where we stand
now...." (emphasis added) (Preliminary Hearing T.<)
However, Mr. Humphries had a choice of additional time in
jail or waiving a conflict of interest.

A choice a person really

should not have to make, simply because if a person wants an
attorney, free of prejudice, it does not mean he should wait in
jail longer.

Counsel of prejudice and bias represented Mr.

Humphries at the Preliminary Hearing the the jury decision should
be overturned.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant did not received a fair and impartial Trial.
The Trial was fought with errors.
to the Jury.

Errors that caused prejudice

Because the sum total of these errors was

substantial prejudices, the Jury decision should be reversed.
DATED this _1_ day of May, 1989.

feVEN C. VANDEl(LINf
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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12 i
I

H0N0RA3LE

K. ROGER 3 E A N , Judge

Presiding.

I

13

:
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!
i
i

15
i

APPEARANCES
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17

i

18

'
j

19

!

FOR T H E P L A I N T I F F

! FOR THE D E F E N D A N T
i
21

,

22 .

BRIAN NAMBA

D e p u t y Davis County Attorncv
23 East State
Farr.ii n g t o n , Utah
8402b
T e l e p h o n e : -451-3226
GLEN T . CELLA
A t t o r n e y at Lav;
251 East 2 0 0 South
C l e a r f i eld , Utah <34ul 5
Telephone:
825-2202
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P R 0 C t t u I N

1

2

THE C O U R T :

3
4

I
i

case, State

We w i l l

return
>\r.

vs. Humphries, 381U00669.

to the Hu.'nn r i T s '
Humphries

is

i

5I

present

under

6 i

Mr. Namba

7 I

set

for

custody, Mr. Cella,

is p r e s e n t

for the S t a t e

preliminary

counsel

that y o u

appoint

prefer

10

we d o n ' t

11

sent y o u r s e l f

if y o u w o u l d

12

represent

here

13

about

you

that,

different

this

conflict

!

20 I

has

is the

been

advised

another

lawyers.

l i k e , or y o u

with

lawyer,

You

can

can h a v e M r .

Do you

have

a

tim-

anc

repreCella

preference

W e l l , Your Honor,

attorney
Would

MR. H U M P H R I E S :
has

This

Cella
you

and

tnere

is

myself.

identify

the

conflict

us?

18 :
19

to n a v e

afternoon.

THE C J U R T :

16

for

the Court

defense

MR. H U M P H R I E S :
a definite

present.

sir?

14
15

of U t a h .

is

examination.

Mr. H u m p h r i e s ,
through

his c o u n s e l ,

told me that

Barton

and

also

Your Honor, attorney

ne has p r o s e c u t e d
he is a l s o

employed

two c a s e s

for

by the C i t y

Cella

detective
of

Layton

I

in the c a p a c i t y

of c i t y

attorney.

21 !

M,*<. C E L L A :

That's

not e x a c t l y

correct,

22 '
J u d g e , C i t y of K a y s v i l l e .

The

investigating

officer

is

23 j
j

detective

Barton with

Kaysville

lity.

24 I
25 |

I, h o w e v e r ,

had

I known

ahead

of t i m e

that

you -- he is in custody
which

ano you have your

Steve just got stuffed

by Judge

<;R. C E L L A :
a uesire
has asked

to proceea
that

U e l l , fir. H u m p h r i e s has

I represent

I don't

THE C O U R T :
M r . H u m p h r i e s , and then

said and that

is not w h a t

give you a chance

13

that's

not w h a t you

14

allow him to f i n i s h .

All

r i g h t , you can tell ne

We are prepared

t o d a y , Your H o n o r .

17 :

that

18 ;

m a k e the e l e c t i o n

if he w a n t s

19 •

at a later d a t e .

He is not going

20 i wants

I
21 :'

coming

24 | As

the P r e l i m i n a r y

counsel

election.

please

forward

to a c o n t i n u a n c e

to have a P r e l i m i n a r y
to ue r e l e a s e d .

Hearing
If he
to

time.

Hearing

M r . H u m p h r i e s , we w o n ' t go
today, as you say, under

s u g g e s t e d , you are going
E i t h e r you

if

The D e f e n d a n t o u g h t , i t h i n k , to

THE C O U R T :

23 : with

to go

the time p e r i o d , we have no o b j e c t i o n

back at a later

22 :

25

We have no o b j e c t i o n

is d e s i r e d .

to w a i v e

t a l k i n g , so

that

Go a h e a d , ilr. C e l l a .

16

is w h a t

to s p e a k .

Honor.

said w h e n he finishes

MR. C E L L A :

15

lawyer,

W e l l , he is saying what I

I s a i d , Your

THE C O U R T :

12

--

Let ne hear from y o u r

MR. H U M P H R I E S :

11

Hearing

--

Your h o n o r

I will

incicated

i t , a p r o t e s t , and

hin at the P r e l i m i n a r y

MR. H U M P H R I E S :

10

Cornaby.

unaer what he calls

and do it under p r o t e s t .

lu-ciay probl-r.i,

--

to have to make

an

ahead
protest.

to go a h e a d
if t h e r e

and

hear these witnesses

is any

infirmity

is a n y c o n f l i c t ,
tion

then

that m i g h t

a conflict

be a v a i l a b l e

Oefenaant

an e r r o r

THE
to s n o w

that

bailiff

on the w a y

tnree
then

he w e n t on

on to e x p o u n d

about

there

was

to f u r t h e r

so

I would

like

expound

HUMPHRIES:

THh

COURT:

the

like

moments

it u n t i l
a g o and

might

and

the

attorney

make

He told

he w o u l d
have

record

just

here

a continuance

and

-I --

interrupt

in a m o m e n t .

to the C o u r t

kept q u i e t

to s h o w

the

be b a c k

ne,

He

went

because
that

and was aware of, 1 g u e s s ,
about

he

he

has

that
it, and

that.
is t h e r e

something

that

Court?

MR. H U M P H R I E S :
a w a r e of

unrepre-

the

have a c o n t i n u a n c e

it s e e m s

record

to tell

like

Your Honor, may

l«ow, fir. H u m p h r i e s ,
you would

t h a t an

games.

that

from you

he w o u l d

infirmity

time.

N o , y o u m a y not

hear

the c o n f l i c t

that

he w o u l d

MR.

that

some

is p l a y i n g

to c o u r t

to get o n e and

known

for a n o t h e r

W e l l , I would

because

I will

th-re

reparable.

COURT:

here

or f o u r t i m e s

a way

be

if

in the cross-exar.n na-

do c r o b S - e x a n i n a t i o n

the D e f e n d a n t

Mr. Humphries.

knew

not

exists

I am c o n c e r n e d

who would

that w o u l d

- - bui i g u e s s

in c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n ,

MR. NAMuA:
sented

and

Cella

told me that

Your Honor,

I wasn't

interviewed ne just

he haa a c t u a l l y

really
a few

prosecuted

cases

7

MR. C E L L A :
h a v e - - fir, V a n d e r l i n d e n
someone

How w o u l d the C o u r t f e e l , 1 can

can't a p p e a r t o a a y .

from his o f f i c e here t o m o r r o w a f t e r n o o n .

\Ar. C a t h c a r t ,

I c a n ' t get him here t o d a y .

also tomorrow

afternoon.
I've

would

He can

Hearing.

I have i n d i c a t e d

today.

to him that

H o w e v e r , it w o u l d

represent

him, assuming

represent

him any f u r t h e r .

he

Preliminary

I w o u l d only

serve

and
him

as

I wouldn't

he was bound o v e r , I w o u l d n ' i
He w o u l d have a n o t h e r

d e f e n d e r or I could o b t a i n p r i v a t e c o u n s e l
TH£ C O U R T :

All

right

for

public

him.

—

5394.)

HR. C c L L A :
and p r o c e e d

appear

I could go a h e a d

for the P r e l i m i n a r y H e a r i n g o n l y .

(tna of tape

I called

r e q u i r e a w a i v e r from

on the r e c o r d of the c o n f l i c t and
counsel

havt

t a l k e d w i t h H r . H u m p h r i e s , he's --

like to go ahead and p r o c e e d w i t h the

handle

I can

Dut he woulci like to go a h e a d

t o d a y so he can find out w h a t

is going 10

happen

so t h a t he d o e s n ' t have to sit in jail w a i t i n g until we can
get a n o t h e r d a t e .

to c o v e r my

H o w , is that

•-

TH£ C O U R T :

That's

agreeable.

MR. C t L L A :

I perceive

that as being

okay

bases.
THt C O U R T :

Mr. Hunphries

for t a l k i n g

I think

it i s .

I coixieno you

and

it t h r o u g h and v/orking it o u t .
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APPENDIX C

PILED
JUL 201939
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
^ ^ ¥ - '.*'.? ?:» Court
^gT-< Ccu.-t <?{ Appeal*

OOOOO

State of Utah,

ORDER

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No, 880704-CA

v.
Thomas R. Humphries,
Defendant and Appellant,

This matter is before the Court upon appellant's Motion To
Appoint New Counsel On Pendency Of Appeal, filed 26 June 1989.
Appellant is currently represented by counsel who was
appointed by the Second Judicial District Court. Counsel
entered an appearance herein on 3 February 1989 and, to date,
has filed a docketing statement and brief on behalf of
appellant. Counsel has responded timely to inquiries made by
the Court with respect to this appeal.
Appellant shows no substantial conflict of interest with
his attorney. As appellant was appointed competent counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant's motion is denied. If
appellant prefers new counsel, appellant is not precluded from
hiring counsel of his choice.
Dated this J20

day of July 1989.
BY THE COURT:

udge Norman H. Jackson

APPENDIX D

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,.
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. S80104-CA

vs .
Category No. 2

THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES,
Defendant-Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a jury decision finding the Defendant guilty of
Issuing a Bad Check of Draft Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated
on November 4, 1938.
Steven C. Vanderlinden
of VANDERLINDEN AND COLTON
1133 North Main.. Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone (801) 544-9930
Attorney for Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 880104-CA

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Category No. 2

THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES,
Defendant-Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken
Annotated.

The

pursuant to Sec. 73-29-3 (f) Utah Code

Defendant-Appellant was found guilty of Issuing

a Bad check of Draft Sec. 76-6-505 Utah Code Annotated, a Felony
of the Third Degree in the Second Judicial District Court, in and
for Davis County, State of Utah, November 4, 1983.

Defendant was

sentenced December 6, 1938 and an appeal was filed December 22,.
1933.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether

or not Defendant preserved

four of

issues raised on Appeal.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Sec. 77-35-27 (Rule 27)

Stays pending appeal.

(a) (1) A sentence of death shall be stayed
if an appeal or a petition for other relief is
pending.
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or
probation shall be stayed if an appeal is
taken and a certificate of probable cause is
issued.
(3)
When an appeal is taken by the
state, a stay of any order or judgment in
favor of the defendant may be granted by the
court upon good cause pending disposition of
the appeal.
-1-

the five

(b) A, qertificate of pr.obable cause sh$ll
be issued if the court hearing the application
determines that there are meritorious issues
that should be decided by the appellate court.
A certificate of probable cause may be issued
by the trial court or, if denied by the trial
court, by the court to whom an appeal is
taken. The application for a certificate of
probable cause shall be in writing, state the
grounds for the issuance of the certificate
and shall be served upon the prosecuting
attorney. A hearing on the application for a
certificate of probable cause shall be held
after notice to all parties.
(c) If a certificate of probable cause is
denied, the defendant shall commence or
continue
to undergo
sentence.
If the
certificate of probable cause is granted, the
court granting the certificate may continue
the defendant in custody at an appropriate
place of detention, or admit the defendant to
bail or release pending appeal on suitable
terms and conditions.
The decision on the
request of the defendant for release to bail
is subject to review by the appellate court
for abuse of discretion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant

filed an appeal

issuing a bad check.

from a conviction

of guilty of

Defendant has since filed his appellant

brief and Respondent has filed their Brief.

Respondent's Brief

alleges most issues raised on appeal were not raised in front of
the trial Judge.
Defendant thorough newly appointed Counsel had a hearing on
a Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause of March 14, 1939.
(t. 3 ) 1 Several of Defendant's issues raised on appeal were ruled
on by the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby

(see addendum marked as

exhibit 1 ) , in the Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause.
-21

,J

r" rerers to the Certificate of Probable Cause transcript
dated March 14, 1989.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

Defendant

raised

several

issues

on

appeal.

The

respondent contends that four out of the five issues raised on
appeal are moot because Defendant failed to raise those issues at
the trial.

Appellant submits that the issues were in fact raised

at the Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause.

The Judge at

the Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause ruled that none of
the issues raised were sufficient

to reach the limited

burden

required for the issuance of a certificate of probable cause.
Thus it would be frivolous and without merit to ask the trial
Judge

to dismiss

the

charges, grant

a new

trial, a directed

verdict or other post conviction remedies available to Defendant
when the burden for each is heavier than the burden to issue a
Certificate of Probable Cause.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT PRESERVED
FOUR OF THE FIVE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL
The trial Court Judge in the above case had the opportunity
to review the issues raised on appeal.
referred

to in Respondent's brief

All four of the issues

in point

I, were raised in

Defendant's Motion for a Certificate of Probable Cause.

Each and

every issue was ruled insufficient even for the limited burden of
giving the Defendant a stay pending an appeal.
On March 28, 1989, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby had a
hearing
Cause.

on

Defendant's

Motion

for

a

Certificate

of

Probable

There were several meritorious issues presented to Judge
-3-

Cornaby to support the argument that Defendant's sentence should
be stayed pending appeal.

Among the issues were the following

1)

The prosecutor expressed his personal opinion in closing
arguments.
testified.

2)

The

prosecutor

threatened

a witness

if

she

3) The prosecutor's comments on Defendant's failure

to have witnesses testify.

4) The court allowing other bad checks

not charged in the information into evidence.
The burden of the Defendant for the court to issue a stay
pending appeal is much less than the burden to either dismiss the
conviction or order a new trial, or any other post conviction
remedy available to the Defendant.

In a Motion for a Certificate

of Probable Cause Sec. 77-35-27 (Rule 27) states in part:
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or
probation shall be stayed if an appeal is
taken and a certificate of probable cause
issued.
(3)
(b) A certificate of probable cause
shall be issued if the court hearing the
application determines that there are
meritorious issues that should be decided
by the appellant court
"
The Supreme Court of Utah recently ruled on Rule 27.
We hold that under our Rule 27, in issuing a certificate
of probable cause preliminary to consideration of release
pending appeal, the court must determine that the issue
of fact or law raised on appeal are substantial. There
are two prongs to the test for determining whether issues
raised are "substantial".
First, the Question raised
must be either (1) Novel, mi. e., there is no Utah
precedent that governs or (2)
Fairly debateable . A legal
issue is fairly debatable is Utah precedent bearing on
the issue presents conflicting points of view when
applied to the facts of the cause or is other wise
unclean. Second, the legal issue raised must also be
-4-

integral to the conviction, e. g., if error in the
proceedings below would be considered harmless in light
of the precedent, the certificate should not issue."
State v. Neelev, 707 P. 2d 647 (Utah 1985).
Judge

Cornaby,

cognizant

of

the

burden,

and

having

a

transcript of the trial at his disposal ruled that all four issues
raised on appeal in this case, were insufficient to even be fairly
debatable.

His write decision is more specific.

In the written

decision he states, in the first issue (the prosecutor expressing
his own opinion) , that it should not have been done, but interprets
what the prosecutor meant to say, (see addendum pg. 2 paragraph 3) .
In the second issue, (the prosecutor threatening a witness if she
testified), he rules
paragraph 8 ) .

there was no threat

(see addendum

pg. 2

In the third issue, (the prosecutor's comments on

Defendant's failure to have witnesses testify), the court said the
prosecutor should not have done it, but the trial attorney should
have objected.

The last issue respondent claims the trial court

never reviewed, (allowing other bad checks into evidence), was in
fact brought before Judge Cornaby.
admissable

to

show

the

Defendant's

The Judge ruled
intent.

Then

they were
the

Judge

concludes and rules there were no issues raised to justify the
issuance of a certificate of probable cause.
All issues raised by the Defendant in his initial brief have
been reviewed by the trial court.

All issues have also been

determined

issues sufficient

to lack

fairly debatable

issuance of a Certificate of Probable Cause.

for the

It makes no sense and

is at best a motion in futility and a burden on the court system
to go before the same court and move for mistrial, arrest of
Judgment, new trial or other post conviction remedies, when the
-5-

Judge has already ruled them insufficient for the limited burden
of issuance of a Certificate of Probable Cause*

CONCLUSION
The Defendant respectfully submits the issues raised on appeal
have been presented to the trial Judge and ruled upon.

The issues

are properly before the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this

day of

, 1989.

STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN
Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant on this
day of
, 1989, by first class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid
upon:
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN
Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT 1

ISS3 MAR 31 K?tt*»
In the Second Judicial District Courtin and for the

mK,

County of Davis, State of Utah

BY.

; : : [

:..::J."T

,*'f6
In u» i' CLc.rv

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES,

RULING ON MOTION FOR
CERTIFICATE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE
Criminal No. 6119

Defendant.
The defendant's motion for a certificate of probable cause
came before the court for oral argument on March 28, 1989, with
Brian J. Namba appearing for the plaintiff and Steven C.
Vanderlinden appearing for the defendant. After oral argximent,
the plaintiff presented a responding brief to the court.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff had not been given proper time to
prepare the brief it was accepted by the court • The court took
the motion under advisement. The court now rules on the motion.
The motion for a certificate of probable cause is denied.
1
The photocopy of Thomas R. Humphries drivers license was
proper evidence under U. R. E., Rule 901(a).
2. The bank records, including checks not charged as
criminal violations in the Information, were admissible to show
knowledge and intent on the part of the defendant.
2. The
defendant's
knowledge
of
the
issuance
of
insufficient funds checks was a jury question and the jury
resolved the issue in favor of the State.
4. There was no break in the :;hain of evidence with regards
to the checks which was significant to the trial. The defendant
admitted he wrote those very checks.

Fll mn

5. The defendant was appointed competent counsel.
No
substantial conflict of interest is shown.
The only way the
defendant can have counsel of his choice is to hire counsel.
6. The State should not have questioned the defendant about
his failure to have* Steve Brown come to court and testify. On
the other hand, the defendant had an obligation to object if he
did not want the evidence presented to the jury. The issue is
not, therefore, a proper matter for the appellate court.
7. It was not proper for the State to give an opinion : n
closing argument on the defendant's dishonesty.
The argument,
however, must te taken in its totality. The State repeats the
opinion in several places.
What the State was really saying,
however, was that the evidence shows the defendant is dishonest.
Also, the defendant failed to object to the argument of counsel.
8. The prosecution did not threaten a defense witness. The
witness was properly advised of both perjury and fifth amendment
rights out of the hearing of the jury.
The testimony of the
witness thus probably became favorable to the defendant.
The
jury would tend to believe the witness was paid money by the
defendant for deposit since she was taking the* fifth amendment.
Again the defendant did not raise a proper objection.
9. A "not guilty" verdict form was given to the jury.
There is no valid issue on this point.
None of the aforementioned issues meet the standards for
issuance of a certificate of probable cause.
The defendant's motion is denied.
Dated March 29, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

-8-

